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ABSTRACT
Finland is the only country in the world where all ports freeze 
over during a typical winter. Over the century 1878–1978, Finland 
developed a winter-seafaring system that broke the winter isolation 
and eliminated seasonal variation in shipping. By using diverse 
archival sources, we deconstruct the dominant narrative of Finnish 
winter seafaring through which national as well as technological 
development is often presented as natural, inevitable and 
straightforward. We reinterpret the Finnish winter navigation system 
as a tangible, historical experience and show that technological 
solutions in this domain cannot be understood outside the context 
of a decades-long process of nation-building. Finally, we argue 
that winter navigation became a central imaginary for Finland as a 
western, industrial and modern nation. As such, the Finnish winter-
seafaring system presents a case of technological nationalism in which 
a small, peripheral country sought to integrate itself into a modern 
international order.
Introduction
‘Finland is an island and all of its ports freeze over during a normal winter’ has been 
an oft-repeated saying in Finnish discourse.1 It makes natural the idea that this northern 
country is both strongly dependent on icebreaking and particularly capable of managing 
its wintry condition. In order to eliminate seasonal variation in trade, Finland operates an 
icebreaking fleet that is second only to the major Arctic countries, Russia and Canada. This 
article discusses the development of the Finnish winter navigation system over the century, 
1877–1977. We argue that the deterministic, nationalistic narrative from ice to icebreakers 
fails to capture the complexity of Finnish history. Finland is not an island and icebreak-
er-assisted winter seafaring was not the only means of transport. Mere industrialisation 
and export trade fails to explain why winter navigation became perceived, to invoke the 
terminology of Thomas Hughes, as a reverse salient in the late nineteenth century. Nor, does 
it explain why, during the twentieth century, the Finnish state directed significant public 
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HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY  221
resources, again and again, to these expensive, special purpose vessels, which saw limited 
use only for three to four months in a given year.
We study the decision-making in winter seafaring committees, government organisa-
tions as well as the public discussion related to icebreaker acquisitions. We are interested in 
the explicit arguments and implicit presumptions in these discussions: how the decision- 
makers perceived the function and role of icebreakers in the Finnish national infrastructure 
system and their relation to national identity. We then revisit the classical presentations 
of the history of Finnish winter navigation to understand how the dominant nationalistic 
narrative about icebreakers was constructed and established.
In the late nineteenth century, Finland was not a sovereign state but a part of the Russian 
empire and was practically isolated from Western Europe during winters. We argue that 
icebreakers became important because a nationalistically minded technocratic elite saw 
them as a technology that could greatly contribute to their nation-building efforts, thus 
making Finland the modern, Western country they wanted it to be. Nationalism, economic 
and political incentives were inseparable components in this process.2
Building the winter seafaring system was a contested process. In order to shield it from 
political uncertainty, a threefold strategy emerged. First, a range of economic, political, and 
industrial stakeholders were invited to participate in policy-making. Second, the decisions 
they made were made to seem natural through a widely shared technocratic rhetoric. Finally, 
both the system and the rhetoric were presented as a success story that resonated with other 
aspects of Finnish national narratives. As a result, icebreakers became not only necessary 
for the economy and national well-being but also ‘monuments of collective identification’.3 
In fact still today, they are seen as something inherently Finnish, brave and innovative.4 As 
such the development of the Finnish winter navigation exemplifies how technocratic beliefs 
and nationalism were intertwined projects.
Technological nationalism shapes development by providing governments the justi-
fication for supporting technological projects that demonstrate strength and prowess. 
Meanwhile technology contributes to national identity by performing critical symbolic 
work: presenting a sense of collective self-sufficiency, by constructing a shared narrative of 
community, and distinguishing a nation from others.5 Technological nationalism is, in fact, 
often understood through gigantic, heroic projects undertaken by big countries to accrue 
prestige and demonstrate technological prowess in international forums.6 Peripheral and 
late-coming countries are typically seen as uninteresting and passive adaptors of technology 
transferred from centres.7 We contribute to the literature of technological nationalism by 
presenting a case from a small country that did not have financial or intellectual resources 
comparable to big and advanced countries but an equal desire to define itself through tech-
nological progress. A century-long period of focus enables us to study how these national 
meanings given to a technological project transformed through time.
For this purpose, we analyse the winter navigation system through the concept of ‘large 
technological systems’, initially devised by Thomas Hughes.8 The Finnish system was built 
from many components, including icebreakers and ice-capable merchant ships, their 
manufacturers and users, research facilities, ice classifications as well as legal innovations. 
Following Hughes, as this system matured, various political-economic-technological issues 
arose. Within this analysis, ‘system builders’ recognised these as ‘reverse salients’ and took 
action to overcome them. In developing this large technological systems, Finnish actors 


































222   S. MATALA AND A. SAHARI
among, engineers, industrialist, and politicians.9 Identifying the central decision-makers, 
system builders, and their main motivations, allows us to analyse systemic values that shaped 
the development of the Finnish winter navigation system.
We use a variety of sources to deconstruct the history of the Finnish winter navigation 
system. We draw on public records from various government agencies, mainly the Finnish 
maritime administration10 and the ministry of trade and industry11 as well as various cabi-
net and ministry committees. To see beyond institutional boundaries, we also incorporate 
material from private archives of key participants, ranging from politicians to ship con-
structors and public maritime figures. These sources, we argue, demonstrate the socially 
constructed nature of icebreakers, as symbol and artefacts, and their relation to Finnish 
aspirations as a modern nation.
The article is divided into three parts, which correspond to key phases in Finnish history 
as well as the changing role of technology transfer in Finnish industrialisation. The first part 
of our story, 1878–1917, is one of transnational technology transfer from Western Europe 
and the United States. At that time, the Grand Duchy of Finland was a part of the Russian 
Empire. It had no history as a national unit, but a nationalistically inspired cultural move-
ment12 had begun to construct the idea of a separate Finnish nation. The importance of 
cultural symbols, political rhetoric and economic connections in shaping Finnish national 
self-understanding during this early period is generally well recognised in the histories of 
Finnish state- and nation-building.13 The search for and adoption of technology to over-
come tangible problems of connecting Finland to the larger world has become muddled 
and obscured by later nationalistic narratives. In the second part, 1917–1945, winter nav-
igation becomes a preoccupation of the newly independent Finnish state. Between 1918 
and the Second World War, the expenses of winter navigation were hotly contested while a 
slow but noticeable increase in icebreaking capacity took place. In the context of national 
storytelling, though, icebreaking became important by showcasing indigenous technological 
capability instead of mere technology transfer. Such advance promoted but did not establish 
an international image of Finland as a modern western country. Finally, in the third part, 
1944–1978, we describe the overwhelming expansion of winter navigation resulting from 
the widespread acceptance of the icebreaker as a crucial technology to ensure Finland’s ties 
with European countries during the cold war. Finland now rapidly transformed from an 
agricultural to an industrial country. Simultaneously, the capability to eliminate seasonal 
variation in shipping became accepted as a natural and necessary feature of Finland as a 
modern country.
Inventing a nation of winter seafaring
We the outpost of Europe against the nature/among the ice is our laurel wreath burnished/and 
we reap our bread out of the ice and the snow.14
Two concurrent shifts in shipbuilding were fundamental for the early period of this analysis: 
the transition from sail to steam and from wood to iron and steel enabled the building of 
ships that were better able to withstand the pressure of ice, giving rise to visions of uninter-
rupted seaborne traffic in Europe and North America in the mid-nineteenth century.15 The 
first steps in building a special-purpose icebreaking vessel occurred in economic shipping 


































HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY  223
region both in relative and absolute terms. Connections to Europe were cut every year for 
months by the onset of winter. The crop failure in 1867 demonstrated the consequences of 
isolation imposed by nature. With winter lingering on and grain ships unable to bring relief, 
some 110,000 people starved to death or fell to illness in the last great Finnish famine. The 
tragedy not only amplified calls for industrialisation and security of supply but also gave 
momentum for overcoming the problem of winter isolation.17
Most of Finnish population and economic production were, and still are, concentrated 
on a headland surrounded by two long bays of the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Bothnia in the 
North and the Gulf of Finland stretching eastward towards St. Petersburg. Both freeze over 
in the winter (Figure 1). This natural fact separates Finland from other winter navigating 
countries, such as Sweden, Russia and Canada, which all have some ports open all year 
long. From the point of view of logistics and in the absence of railways and other means of 
international transportation, Finland indeed resembled an isolated island in the nineteenth 
century.18 Given the tangible effects of natural forces in everyday survival, it is not surprising 
that both contemporary and later commentators start their narratives with reference to these 
geographical imperatives in the development of the Finnish icebreaking.
Nevertheless, the decision to acquire the first icebreaker for Finland in the 1880s did not 
inevitably rise from geographical restrictions or economic necessities. Icebreakers were not 
the only possible technology for ensuring winter international traffic. From 1870 onwards, 
railways connected Finland to the imperial capital of St. Petersburg providing a secure means 
to supply grain in winter. While shipping was nigh impossible during the height of winter, 
the sea ice surface did allow lighter traffic across the Gulf of Bothnia to Sweden. A postal 
service had been run with horse-drawn sledges to and from the eastern Swedish provinces 
in Finland in the eighteenth century.19 Still, with the sea-lanes blocked by ice, the exporters 
of important commodities such as butter and timber could only hope for an early spring to 
access markets in Germany and the United Kingdom.20
Icebreaking – as a publicly funded service for export trade with purpose-built ships – 
was established only gradually in an on-going negotiation with the aforementioned other 
options.21 Given foreign examples of icebreaking ships, Finnish industrialists and politicians 
redefined the winter embargo as a solvable technological problem instead of an insur-
mountable natural condition. The strongest advocates of Finnish icebreaker procurement 
were supporters of stronger western connections and Finnish economic independence 
from Russia for political and economic reasons.22 Doctor Knut Pipping, a Finnish railway 
booster, had already distilled the issue in 1861 by calling for courage and faith in future in 
infrastructure and communications technology development:
[Finland] as a country, that only lately has begun its life as a Finnish nation, whose only recently 
risen self-confidence gives grounds for optimism, shall not allow disbelief and depression to 
frighten it off to make transient sacrifices, with which it must buy its future grandeur.23
Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, numerous Finnish newspapers published articles on the 
‘ice-breaking question’, arguing the feasibility of ice navigation in general, presenting the 
best technology for doing so, and highlighting the role of the public sector in organising 
winter navigation. Albin Stjerncreutz, the assistant director of the Finnish pilotage service 
responded to Pipping’s optimism by stating: ‘every sensible man has to understand that 
winter navigation in the southernmost Finnish port of Hanko will forever remain a dream’.24
Despite this very public debate, a group of private businessmen decided to try winter 


































224   S. MATALA AND A. SAHARI
rural fishing village to the national network and St. Petersburg in the hopes of extending 
the navigation season. Competing against Russian Baltic ports further south, the Hanko 
gamble didn’t pay off and within two years the company went bankrupt, having failed to 
attract sufficient traffic from other parts of Russia. The Finnish Senate stepped in and bought 
the Hanko port and railway, thus establishing the harbour as the primary winter gateway to 
and from Finland. Then in 1877, another group of private businessmen launched a regular 
shipping route between Hanko and Stockholm, using an ice-strengthened passenger ship 
‘Expressen II’. This venture went bankrupt as well, but again the Senate funded a new state-
run operation to keep the service going. The ship had room for 26 passengers and a small 
amount of cargo, managing approximately four to five round trips in a winter.25
At the same time, the technical development of winter navigation was taking place in 
Germany, the Nordic Countries, and on the east coast of the USA where the demands of traf-
fic were greater and environmental conditions milder. A purpose-built icebreaker emerged 
from these experiments in the 1870s.26 The growing Finnish export industry pushed for 
more government involvement to ensure regular, reliable, and affordable trade. Doctor 
Pipping had already echoed this sentiment in a newspaper article, stating that ‘without 
well-being we have no future and without connections we have no well-being’.27 Despite 
Figure 1.  Finnish ports and the Baltic region showing Finland’s borders at different times and the 
approximate extent of sea ice in winter. continuous arctic ice rarely reaches scandinavia. source: © aaro 
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being small and lacking in cargo capacity, ‘Expressen’ proved to public officials that winter 
navigation was not merely a dream. The Senate founded a pilotage committee in 1885 to 
plan the purchase of an icebreaking vessel that could maintain connections to Sweden 
throughout the winter.28
Impatient for results and wanting to press the issue, in 1889, the leading forestry magnate 
G. A. Serlachius and the director of the state economic and industrial office Leo Mechelin 
invited the Baltic’s most advanced icebreaker, the Danish ‘Bryderen’, to visit Hanko to 
demonstrate the usefulness of this new technology.29 Moved by the display of a ship over-
coming the environment, the journalist K. A. Tawasjerna wrote that:
We were overcome with pure patriotic and hopeful feelings. This modern mechanical struggle 
against the ice meant more to our country than any other battle to have taken place thus far on 
its white snowy banks. There the liberation from chains of poverty and frost approached us in 
the form of the two black steamships. We celebrated the victory of the human-genius against 
prejudice and the tough, cold nature of Finland.30
The stunt led to hoped-for results. Newspapers noted the visit with optimism declaring 
the ‘end of the icebreaking question’. Indeed, ‘Bryderen’ marked the turning point in the 
Finnish debate. The harsh winter of 1888–1889 proved other means of icebreaking – such 
as explosives or ice saws – incapable of keeping the port of Hanko open. Also from this 
moment onwards, the issue of winter navigation was closely linked to the interests of Finnish 
forestry and shipping industries. Acting on the advice of the economic and industrial office, 
the Senate decided to place an order for an icebreaker with Swedish Bergsunds machinery 
works,31 and on Christmas Eve, 1889, the first Finnish icebreaker was ceremoniously named 
after the Danish ship as ‘Murtaja’ (the Breaker).32 Icebreaking was an emerging technology 
at this point and few engineers or ship constructors had any experience of it. Consequently, 
Bergsunds ended up following pre-existing Danish and German plans in designing the ship.
‘Murtaja’s’ maiden voyage to Finland was delayed until late spring 1890, when there 
was little ice left to run tests and prove the icebreaker’s worth. The Finnish public met the 
ship with mixed feelings. Journalists described the Grand Duchy’s most expensive ship as 
a ‘magnificent iron giant’, but also as ‘clumsy-looking steely egg’, the ‘worst floating sea-pig 
in the world’ or as an ‘elephant’.33 Regardless of its odd appearance, questionable technical 
capacity and economic feasibility, all newspapers could agree that the ship represented 
progress with its electric lights that ‘transformed the heavy giant into a brilliant fairy-tale 
ship’, lighting up the capital, Helsinki, from ‘the dock to the top of the steeple’ (Figure 2).34
This first Finnish icebreaker did not mark a breakthrough in actual winter navigation. 
‘Murtaja’s’ design was based on prevailing European ideas on icebreaking that soon became 
obsolete in the 1890s. These ships were spoon-shaped in order to rise on top of the ice sheet 
and crush it under their weight. When ‘Murtaja’ had to cut through snow-covered banks, 
it tended to get stuck, and in open waters it heeled and pulled unpredictably. All in all, the 
government icebreaker service considered the ship generally difficult to handle.35 Still the 
icebreaker did, by and large, do what it was meant to do, even if it failed to meet high pub-
lic expectations. These mixed results focused discussion in all major Finnish newspapers 
on the potential of icebreaker technology to support western trade.36 Despite its defects, 
‘Murtaja’ established the icebreaker as necessary infrastructure and a symbol of technology 
overcoming the harsh natural constraints. As a leading newspaper put it: ‘Murtaja will fight 


































226   S. MATALA AND A. SAHARI
The Finnish association for technology38 now took on the challenge for developing winter 
navigation prowess. Activist engineers Robert Runeberg,39 Karl Bonsdorff and John Eager 
together with Baron K. E. Palmén dominated the increasingly technical discussion in the 
1890s and came to lead the Senate committee on winter navigation.40 These socially well-
placed, Swedish-speaking technologists found a willing audience in the Finnish Senate and 
among the public. Runeberg and Palmén documented the development of winter seafaring 
technology in a pair of influential articles published by the association and circulated in 
the Senate.41 Meanwhile, Bonsdorff took a publicly paid trip to Chicago for the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in 1893 and found a solution to the Finnish icebreaker question 
on the Great Lakes.42 The Detroit naval architect Frank E. Kirby had recently designed 
two new icebreaking ferries, ‘Mackinaw’ and ‘Ste Marie’, to help the local forestry industry. 
After observing two tugs operating bow-to-bow in heavy ice, he came up with a two- 
propeller design – one for each end of the ship. Bonsdorff was able to visit these ships and 
copy drawings to bring back home, thus spearheading importation of the American type 
of icebreaker to Europe.43
On the advice of the committee and with the backing of the exporters, the Finnish Senate 
decided to order a new icebreaker in 1897. The tender was placed with the well-known and 
respected British shipyard Armstrong Whitworth, which had built several ships for the 
Russian navy among others.44 As a result, the icebreaker ‘Sampo’45 was one of two built by 
the shipyard in 1897–1898. The Russian navy also ordered the world’s largest purpose-built 
icebreaker ‘Jermak’ for the Baltic fleet. A decade later, the Grand Duchy bought a second 
Figure 2. icebreaker ‘Murtaja’ opening a way to port for sailing ships in a black and white reproduction 
of late eighteenth century painting by Herman af sillén. source: © [deceased 1908, see swedish act 
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Sampo class icebreaker, ‘Tarmo’ (Vigour, 1907) from the Newcastle yard. Despite the obvi-
ous national importance of icebreakers, their procurements from foreign shipyards went 
relatively unquestioned. Only a few nationalistic journalists suggested the procurement of 
new icebreakers from a domestic shipyard, but their arguments were overruled by imme-
diate economic considerations rather than concerns over using the technical experience of 
leading European yards.46
Relations between the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Russian Empire became volatile 
around the turn of twentieth century as the latter pushed for pan-Russian civil and economic 
centralisation much to the chagrin of Finnish nationalists. The ability to conduct export 
trade free from Russian infrastructure became both a political and an economic impera-
tive in Finland. Even though the railway route to Russia was not as vulnerable to winter 
conditions as the maritime routes to the West, it had limited economic significance due to 
similar production structures in Finland and Russia. As an administratively independent 
unit, Finland also had a customs border with Russia. As a result, two thirds of Finnish 
foreign trade went to Germany, Great Britain, and the Nordic Countries rather than the 
imperial capital. The share of Russian markets for Finnish foreign trade grew only during 
the First World War due to war economy and restrictions on Baltic trade. Between 1917 
and 1919, the Finnish paper industry controlled 30% of Russian markets and exported 80% 
of its total production there.47
On the threshold of war, the three Finnish icebreakers were taken over by the Russian 
Baltic Fleet, leaving merchant shipping without assistance. This underlined the fact that 
without sovereignty and its own icebreaker fleet Finland’s connections with the Western 
Europe were still dependent on Russia. Leading Finnish shipping magnate Lars Krogius had 
already become the leader in shipping policy and continued to promote domestic control 
and government subsidies to guarantee the expansion of the maritime trades.48 This set 
the tone for the coming decades. A small technologically minded group of individuals was 
able to convince the central administration in Helsinki that publicly operated icebreakers 
were an efficient and essential way of connecting Finland with Europe throughout the year.
Plotting the national course
As the conditions, in which our winter seafaring is executed, are becoming more dire, it is 
necessary to device a definite program with which to develop the icebreaker question. Instead 
of focusing on any individual polemical issues, the whole program and its future implemen-
tation should be discussed.49
Finland gained independence amid the confusion of the Russian Revolution in 1917. After 
undergoing a harrowing civil war the next winter, the now independent state of Finland 
slowly transitioned to a changed, post-war international political and economic environ-
ment. The forestry industry looked for opportunities in the West – most notably in the 
UK – while shipbuilding fell into a decade-long depression. Finnish shipping continued 
to rely on foreign built second-hand tonnage. Shipping companies even placed orders for 
more advanced ships to European shipyards as a global shipbuilding downturn swept over 
an industry plagued by wartime production glut and post-war cancellations and decreasing 
prices.50 A few substantial liner companies dominated Finnish shipping in the 1920s and 
1930s. The greatest among them was the Finnish Steamship Company51 (FÅA). The afore-


































228   S. MATALA AND A. SAHARI
Henrik Ramsay – a new key member of the maritime lobby.52 FÅA facilitated connections 
between the newly reformed Finnish maritime administration (MKH) and European ship-
yards in the 1920s.53
Navigable routes through the ice-covered Baltic Sea regained their pre-war priority for 
the forestry in the 1920s. The growing size of freighters shipping pulp and paper set new 
requirements for the size of icebreakers.54 When the Treaty of Tartu between Finland, 
Estonia and Soviet Russia confirmed the Finnish-Soviet borders in 1920, the Republic of 
Finland received the area of Petsamo55 and its ice-free port of Liinahamari56 on the Arctic 
Ocean. Nevertheless, this direct access to ice-free seas remained a theoretical option, as 
the railway network ended in Rovaniemi some 500 km of wilderness away from the Artic 
coastline.
Through the 1920s and 1930s, Finland’s uncoupling from Russia further increased the 
dependence on western maritime routes and consequently icebreaker service became an 
expected function of the state. The expensive, domestic development of such specialised 
technology was still unthinkable in 1917. In the early years of independence, the ‘Finnishness’ 
of icebreaking technology was still embedded merely in the ownership and function of the 
icebreakers instead of Finnish construction or design. The commandeering of ‘Tarmo’ amid 
the revolutionary turmoil in 1918 provides an example. The icebreaker was in Russian 
naval hands when Helsinki was taken over by Finnish reds during the civil war. To ‘save’ 
the ship, a group of Finns, led by the centrist senator P. E. Svinhufvud, commandeered the 
icebreaker and delivered it to the whites. Along the way, ‘Tarmo’ exchanged gunfire with a 
Russian icebreaker. While this was a minor event in the history of the Finnish civil war, in 
later retellings it was integrated into the nationalistic liberation myth.57
It took the Finnish government years to make headway on creating an indigenous capa-
bility to build icebreakers. The forestry industry, in particular, pressed the ministry of trade 
and industry into action. The issue of icebreaking spilled over to the media with various 
maritime and shipbuilding specialists fighting over different possible solutions. Finally 
in February 1923, the minister for trade and industry, Aukusti Aho, called a meeting to 
decide the future of Finnish winter seafaring. The list of participants is indicative of the 
gravity of the issue: the forestry industry general council and strongman Axel Solitander; 
Krogius and Ramsay representing not only their companies but also numerous other interest 
groups; Gustaf Wrede, director of MKH; as well as import, home-market and whole-sellers 
associations’ directors alongside specialists in maritime trades and shipbuilding. In short 
any union, interest group or sizeable company with even an indirect interest in the matter 
was present. Together they laid out a plan for Finnish winter navigation comprised of three 
new icebreakers that would guarantee uninterrupted traffic to the southernmost ports of 
Turku, Hanko and Helsinki. Ramsay proved victorious in the debate as a voice of mod-
eration, as the MKH pressed for more ships while leaders for domestic market interests 
sought to limit using scarce public resources on icebreakers. During this process shipbuilder 
K. A. Johansson emerged as the leading Finnish specialist trusted by the ministry and the 
MKH to oversee the procurement of new ships.58
An old ship was bought from Turku and renovated. The ‘Apu’ (Assistance) was the small-
est of the programme. Meanwhile a half-finished icebreaker was bought from the logistics 
company John Nurminen. Engineer Johansson initially designed the ship at a Reval yard in 
Estonia but now continued his work in Finland. This icebreaker ‘Voima’ (Force, 1924) was 
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meeting, but the added expense was met with a lively and critical debate on government 
spending. Johansson carefully documented these developments in a black notebook.59 
Despite concern over costs, the government decided to extend an international tender for 
the world’s largest, sea-going icebreaker, requesting that Johansson develop the specifics. 
Over twenty depression-stricken shipyards across Europe responded to the 1924 tender, 
with the contract finally awarded to the P. Smith Jr. shipyard in Rotterdam. The yard had 
recently built two ice-going cargo ships for FÅA, and its chief engineer consulted on Finnish 
icebreakers. This alone didn’t help the Rotterdam yard to victory though. As a bitter British 
competitor later complained to UK officials, the Dutch shipyard had received significant 
public subsidies from the Dutch state and the city of Rotterdam, enabling a very low bid.60
At the same time, the Finnish maritime cluster began to organise. In February 1925 the 
first Finnish maritime affairs congress was convened in Turku.61 The FÅA chairman Krogius 
stated in his ceremonial opening statement that because government and public opinion had 
failed to grasp the importance of maritime trades in Finland, those present should together 
find the means to advance both shipping and shipbuilding industries in Finland. He also 
pointed out that, though governmental assistance was needed for certain auxiliary tasks, 
such as naval operations, the industries themselves should be first and foremost in solving 
the current predicament. Krogius therefore reaffirmed his previous position on the issue, 
as stated in earlier committee findings in 1912.62 During the discussion, it soon became 
evident that shipping interests were opposed to public subsidies on domestic new-builds, 
which were widely used to direct private ship orders to domestic shipyards. Though the 
privately owned Finnish shipping companies did not want the state regulating from whom 
they should buy their tonnage, they did agree with the shipyards that the state should sup-
port domestic shipbuilding by buying all government ships from Finnish shipyards. Small 
municipal and private harbour icebreakers, however, were not included in this discussion 
on public support until the 1930s.63
In order to enable winter traffic, the state icebreaker system needed to be complemented 
with vessels that were able to follow the icebreaker through the channel it cut in ice. The 
first technical requirements for commercial vessels used in winter seafaring in Finland were 
published in 1930.They were based on international shipping insurance classifications. A 
vessel that belonged to the highest class in open water navigation got ice-class II, whereas 
the special ice-going ships received ice-class I. As the navigation fees commercial ships 
were obliged to pay depended on their ice-class, the ships with the highest class were freed 
from icebreaker fees.64
Meanwhile the Finnish Navy was able to drive through an ambitious new-build pro-
gramme with the help of the maritime cluster in 1925–1927. While the Navy had no ice-
breakers, between 1927 and 1935 its orders helped to save the Turku and Helsinki shipyards 
from the Great Depression and to prepare them to build more advanced, technically complex 
icebreakers. In particular, building submarines and pocket battleships with German aid and 
technological know-how, these shipyards gained competence that enabled the construction 
of the first truly domestic icebreaker, the ‘Sisu’65. Ordered from the Helsinki Shipyard in 
1936, it took almost three years to build due to various construction difficulties and cost 
overruns. The same people, who had been in charge of the earlier Voima project, designed 
the ship – most notably engineer Johansson, now the director of the shipyard.66 ‘Sisu’s’ design 
had been influenced by development in Sweden, where the 1933 ‘Ymer’67 had become the 


































230   S. MATALA AND A. SAHARI
the Finns but also to various other foreign officials, the United States Coast Guard among 
them (Figure 3).68
In the Second World War, Finland lost both the war against the Soviet Union and its 
access to the Arctic Sea. Even though Finland was not occupied, the harsh terms of the 
peace, war-reparations, and the proximity of the St. Petersburg, shadowed the post-war 
years. Immediately after the war, Henrik Ramsay took it upon himself to write the history 
of Finnish winter navigation. Due to his career at FÅA and his public service, Ramsay had 
ready access to domestic and international informants. Now he also had time, as he had 
been sentenced to a term in prison as a cabinet minister in the 1946 war indemnity trials. 
It seems he chose this topic because it resonated with his political and personal ideas about 
Finland’s struggle against geography and towards independence.69
While preparing his manuscript, titled, I kamp med Östersjöns isar,70 he was in contact 
with Johansson, the Swedish maritime bureau, and various experts in Denmark, Germany, 
and the USA. His history became the narrative touchstone for linking icebreaking tech-
nology and the creation of Finland as a modern nation. Ramsay’s exchanges with his peers 
reveal a person on a mission to associate the icebreaking profession with the imagined 
Finnish national character. Like the early nationalistic journalists, Ramsay considered 
Finnish winter navigation as ‘a prerequisite, an indispensable requirement, for the devel-
opment of the Finnish economy and civilization’. While compiling earlier sources with a 
nationalistic point of view, he emphasised Finnish natural-born mastery in fighting the ice, 
especially in comparison to foreigners. As an example, Ramsay referred to the travelogue 
of a British adventurer E. F. Clarke about his passage across the Sea of Åland with Finnish 
Figure 3. Public officials, diplomats and naval officers aboard icebreaker ‘sisu’ in Helsinki south Harbour 
in front of the presidential palace during the second World War. source: © [Unknown photographer, 
Henrik ramsay Private archive, free under Finnish copyright law 49 a § 8.7.1961/404]. reproduced with 
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postal couriers in 1800. While Clarke called the postmen a bunch of lazy cowards, Ramsay 
explained this as the Englishman’s inability to understand the treachery and dangers of the 
winter sea. In addition to winter navigation, Ramsay paid attention to Finnish engineers 
and their contribution to the early development of icebreaking technology. Ramsay also 
overemphasised Johansson’s role in designing icebreakers and eventually turned an inter-
national story of technology transfer into a story of Finnish engineering ingenuity.71
The influence of the Ramsay narrative has been significant, as nearly all writers com-
menting on the history of Finnish winter navigation have repeated it almost verbatim.72 
Throughout the seventy years from the national awakening to the first decades of inde-
pendence, icebreakers had functioned as powerful symbols of modernisation superseding 
backwardness. Starting with Ramsay, Finnish icebreakers were ‘Finnish’ not merely due to 
their ownership or their function in support of maritime traffic, but also because of their 
technology as something original and special to Finland – something that differentiated 
this small country from others. Though factually this latter claim was at least suspect for 
the first half of the twentieth century, it still served as a powerful national narrative.
Naturalising icebreaking
The purpose of icebreaking is to keep all winter ports open throughout the year, even on the 
harshest of winters, when the Baltic is almost completely iced over … … as a consequence, 
the icebreaker fleet must be matched to the worst of times above and beyond the needs of 
milder winters.73
After the Second World War, Finland – still a relatively peripheral country in the European 
context and a latecomer in terms of industrialisation – started a rapid structural transfor-
mation, despite its politically delicate cold war situation. Extensive bilateral trade with 
the Soviet Union raised the value, production volume and political significance of metal 
manufacturing in economic policy considerations as well as in foreign affairs. Exports to 
the Soviet Union comprised approximately 15–20% of the total Finnish exports. Because 
of railway connections east, icebreaker-assisted shipping was not as crucial for this trade 
as they were for western exports. Finnish-Soviet trade did not diminish the importance of 
the western-oriented forestry industry nor of icebreaking. On the contrary, western exports 
delivered badly needed convertible currencies to Finland and countered political and eco-
nomic dependency on the Soviet Union. Several Finnish cold war historians have shown 
that negotiations on European tariffs and customs had a crucial role in Finnish foreign 
policy efforts in developing and maintaining connections to the West.74 Cold war Finland 
‘breathed with its ports’ more than ever and trade connections with the West became crucial 
when dealing with the East.75
Finland’s troubles next to the Soviet Union evoked sympathy in the Western world but as 
Helge Jääsalo, the director of MKH, later noted the markets do not reward the courageous 
and relentless efforts of an incompetent industry.76 In order to be competitive, the forestry 
industry needed cost efficient, continuous and reliable maritime transportation through-
out the year. Unfortunately, Finland had lost the best part of its merchant marine to the 
Soviet Union as war reparations in 1944. The largest state icebreakers ‘Voima’ and ‘Jääkarhu’ 
were also relinquished, significantly diminishing Finnish icebreaking capacity. At the same 
time, the war reparations necessitated an unprecedented ship construction programme that 
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peripheral industry. The forestry sector and the MKH almost frantically demanded that 
new icebreakers be built to restore pre-war capacity.77
The winter of 1946 was bleak and the inflow of western aid was stymied by the strong 
Baltic ice barriers. Again, natural conditions made icebreakers a critical policy issue. The 
Paasikivi cabinet established a committee to design a new state icebreaker and plan the 
tender on 31 January. The severity of the issue was such that the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry chief of staff and former naval commander Svante Sundman was named com-
mittee chairman. As he was also the director of maritime affairs at the ministry and from 
1948 onwards the director of the war reparations administration, Sundman was perfectly 
placed to press the issue. He called on engineer Johansson to participate as the committee’s 
technical specialist, while MKH, as the future recipient of the icebreaker, named its chief 
engineer Ossian Tybeck to the committee. Unfortunately as he and Johansson were by all 
accounts on bad terms, Tybeck didn’t participate substantially in the design work. In March 
1947, the committee recommended the purchase of a sea-going icebreaker that could assist 
large cargo ships, but as shipbuilding resources were tied to the war reparations until late 
1952, the construction of a new icebreaker had to be delayed.78
Global shipbuilding was booming in the late 1940s, and Finland lacked foreign funds to 
even entertain the idea of ordering the ship from abroad. As a result the Helsinki Shipyard 
won the tender as the sole reasonably experienced domestic yard. The new state icebreaker, 
‘Voima,’79 was finally completed in 1953, following construction issues that had plagued the 
shipyard and grated relations between Johansson and his former subordinates. As the first, 
big, modern icebreaker designed and built in Finland, ‘Voima’ was touted as a distinctively 
Finnish feat of engineering. At launch it was the biggest, most modern icebreaker in the 
world with diesel-electric engines able to produce 10,500 shp80 for its four propellers. Two 
of these were at the bow, where they increased the water flow between the hull and ice, 
thereby decreasing friction. The propellers, together with a wider hull and more powerful 
engines allowed ‘Voima’ to assist large cargo ships on longer trips through the Baltic thus 
keeping Finnish winter navigation capacity in line with changing ship technology.81
Convinced of its success with the icebreaker ‘Voima’, the Helsinki shipyard made a stra-
tegic decision to invest in further specialisation in the design and building of ice-going 
vessels and achieved worldwide reputation as the builder of modern icebreakers (Figure 4).82 
Abroad, these giant, high-tech vessels soon became visible showpieces of Finnish industry 
and competence.83 However, the way Finns presented their icebreakers abroad, contrasted 
strongly with the political struggles and public debates they were being subjected to in 
Finland.
Public officials helped the shipyard by reframing the icebreaking issue. The board of 
public transportation published its new findings on winter traffic in Finland in 1957 pro-
posing a ‘rational’ way to organise the national infrastructure system.84 For the first time the 
calculations included cargo traffic data from different ports as well as an estimation of envi-
ronmental effects. During the post-war reconstruction, this kind of technocratic planning 
and Taylorism superseded earlier national romantic approaches in public management.85 
This strengthened the foundation of political support for state icebreakers to include not 
only the interests of export industries or Ramsay’s emotive nationalistic arguments but also 
‘rational cost-efficiency’ as justification for increasing investments in winter navigation. The 
board concluded that merely keeping up present icebreaking capacity would necessitate 


































HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY  233
effective to buy two new smaller ships in addition to ‘Voima’. To keep costs down, regional 
cooperation with Sweden and the Soviet Union was also recommended. The committee 
considered the expansion of winter seafaring capacity self-evident noting that:
It is in the interests of the state to take a more active part in the management of winter traffic. 
As there seems to be no opposition to this in principle, it falls down to the means with which 
to achieve a nationally economically beneficial result.86
As long as the Finnish winter navigation discussion was focused on the Finnish industry’s 
access to western markets, there was a broad agreement that the public sector should main-
tain a sufficient number of icebreakers to connect the southern winter-ports to the Western 
shipping routes in order to guarantee a fair competitive position for Finnish forestry in 
comparison to other Western European countries. This goal gave an economic rationale for 
the icebreaker-building programme. The winter transportation board agreed that Finland 
as a country could not afford winter stoppage in exports and estimated that expanding the 
icebreaker fleet was a more cost effective instrument to support continuous transportation 
than alternative means such as railways. The MKH received five new icebreakers during the 
two decades after the war. However, only two of them, the ‘Voima’ and the ‘Tarmo’(1963), 
were sea-going Baltic icebreakers of over 10,000 shp.87
The new icebreaker did not eliminate seasonal variations. In an average winter, ports in 
northern Finland were closed and cargo was carried by rail to open ports in the south of 
the country. While the political and economic importance of state icebreakers had become 
self-evident, the debate now revolved around the issue of their optimal number and the 
rational organisation of winter transportation via the southern ports. In fact, the winter 
transportation question focused more on railways than icebreakers before the mid-1960s.88 
Emergence of bigger and more powerful icebreakers in the 1960s shifted the debate as to 
Figure 4. icebreaker ‘Voima’ on the gulf of Finland in the winter of 1954. source: © [niilo aljasalo, Wärtsilä 
Helsinki shipyard, FMM collections, published with cc By 4.0 licence]. reproduced with the permission 
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whether to keep the Gulf of Bothnia ports open during the height of winter. Thus, through a 
series of steps the number and capacity of state icebreakers became both a central symbolic 
and practical activity for connecting Finnish conceptions of a modern state.
The two northernmost provinces Oulu and Lapland covered almost half the country but 
were inhabited by less than one eighth of the population. Their economy was historically 
built on poorly productive agriculture and hampered by long distances, inadequate infra-
structure, and lack of capital. Forestry was still spread out all over the country and would 
remain that way, but increasing mechanisation in a variety of industries and agriculture 
spurred urbanisation. Fewer hands were needed in timber harvest when using chainsaws 
and trucks, while the threshing machine and the tractor cut employment in agriculture. 
Consequently, previously agrarian people were moving south to industrial centres.89 The 
Finnish agrarian party, led by President Kekkonen, sought to counter this southward trend 
within the country for the continuance of its political legitimacy. For Kekkonen, coming 
from northern Finland, the governmental intervention in the economic development of 
the North was not only necessary to support the national economy but also essential in 
bringing these remote regions to a level with the rest of the country.90 The expansion of 
the icebreaker fleet was therefore not a mere technical problem or just an economic issue, 
but essentially a flash point for a political struggle on the future of Finland as an integrated 
country. The debate over icebreakers was a proxy for a discussion on equality between 
Northern and Southern parts of the country.91
As winter lockdown increased transportation costs and unemployment levels soared, 
local industrial companies, labour unions and the representatives of port towns along the 
Bay of Bothnia vigorously endorsed winter navigation. Meanwhile allocating taxpayer 
money to keep the northern ports open was opposed by the southern port towns and the 
state-owned railway company VR, both arguing that these limited resources would be more 
optimally used if they were invested in railways and a few southern winter ports. Shipping 
and insurance companies were concerned with increased ice damages and the resulting 
repair costs caused by strong pack ice. Even if state icebreakers were now strong enough to 
open routes to the northernmost ports, the majority of commercial vessels were not strong 
enough to use them. Lars Beckman, the chairman of the Finnish Marine insurance associ-
ation, argued that ice damages incurred north of Vaasa were on average twice as expensive 
suggesting that these might be uninsurable losses:
If it is known in advance that a voyage to a port behind the pack ice barriers is not possible 
without relying on icebreaker hauling and if it is also known that the vessel will suffer from 
serious damages, we are precariously near the limits of insurable risks.92
When Helge Jääsalo93 was appointed as the director of MKH in 1964, the Finnish ice-
breaker fleet got an enthusiastic spokesperson. He was personally interested in developing 
winter navigation and often travelled on one of ‘his’ icebreakers.94 During a particularly 
severe winter in 1966–1967, when even some of southern ports were closed down, Jääsalo 
was able to get the government to approve the purchase of two new Tarmo-class icebreak-
ers: ‘Varma’ (Sure 1968) and ‘Apu’ (Aid, 1970).95 The 1960s winter transport debate was 
triggered by the development of these increasingly powerful and cost-efficient icebreakers 
that consequently made the extension of navigation season to and from the ports north of 
Vaasa on the Gulf of Bothnia technically feasible.
The MKH was responsible for deciding which ports were to be kept open, while Parliament 
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the winter navigation debate actively lobbied both in public and informally through personal 
networks using extensive reports and position papers to justify their points of view. These 
presented different kinds of arguments on the total cost of various modes of transportation 
within the national transportation system. As it is often the case with big and complex 
political decisions, these accounts did not provide unanimous or unambiguous answers.96 
Although the various participants in the discussion argued that their ‘rational’, economic 
and technical calculations superseded their opponents ‘sentimental’ and ‘regional’ consid-
erations, the social construction of ostensibly technical and economic facts seemed to be 
apparent to those involved. As an example, the leading Finnish maritime journal Navigator 
noted that the winter navigation debate was an example of how ‘seemingly reliable-looking 
numbers can be used to justify one’s own opinions while “nicely forgetting” some relevant 
factors’ which did not support their argument.97
In retrospect, the year 1970 appears as a watershed in the icebreaker debate. The Bank of 
Finland published an extensive report on winter transportation emphasising the power of 
‘objective’ and ‘rational’ comparisons between different transportation systems. Some of the 
implications of this study merit closer inspection. Firstly, the report assumed the primary 
unit of analysis was the national economy as a whole and that it was the bank’s role to take 
that perspective. It argued that the procurement of two new icebreakers would lower pub-
lic infrastructure and social costs overall. In doing so, the report shifted the responsibility 
for uninterrupted maritime traffic further to the state from private interests. Secondly, the 
report assumed that the icebreaker fleet should be capable of maintaining reliable traffic 
flow ‘independent of weather conditions’ thus lowering overall risks to the economy. As 
Baltic Sea winters are not alike but the extent and the strength of the ice-cover changes 
considerably from year to year, the icebreaker fleet necessary for especially harsh winters 
would be distinctly oversized for most years. The report refers to these fixed capital costs 
of unused icebreakers as ‘insurance for reliability’.98
Although Jääsalo presents the Bank of Finland report in his memoirs as the main con-
tributor to the solution of the icebreaker discussion (gaining agreement from historians later 
on), the influence of this single study should not be overemphasised.99 Before the publication 
of the report, he had already declared that MKH aimed to keep all major Finnish harbours 
open during normal winters from Hanko in the south to Kemi in the north.100 His confi-
dence was not affected by the fact that the current icebreaker fleet was still insufficient to 
reach this goal. Moreover, Jääsalo’s ambition can hardly be supported by the Bank of Finland 
report, as it explicitly states that keeping the ports up north open throughout normal to 
severe winters is technically possible, but economically infeasible and ‘as an instrument of 
regional policy, too expensive and inefficient’.101 Despite Jääsalo’s claim in his memoir, the 
political debate and friction over icebreakers was not fully resolved.
Despite these inconsistencies in reporting, the Finnish icebreaker fleet attained just this 
capacity by 1975. The two new Finnish icebreakers, ‘Urho’102 (1975) and ‘Sisu’ II (1976), 
marked the beginning of a new era in Finnish winter navigation, where, in principle, ship-
ping was now independent of winter conditions.103 If the economic calculations were not 
enough to justify the investments, how did this turn come about? Through a close reading 
and comparison of multiple sources, we argue that there is no single cause, but that different 
factors interacted to bring about expansion and change. The powerful president Kekkonen 
and his agrarian party supported Director Jääsalo’s relentless pursuit of nationwide prepar-
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his unrelenting advocacy of icebreakers as a critical means to building a modern Finnish 
state, Ramsay made a lasting impression on the MKH director, who saw himself as part of 
a grand tradition by stating that: ‘What brave men have started, was left to economic and 
technical men to develop further’.104
Other important factors are related to the technological development in icebreaking 
and the aforementioned issue of maritime insurance. While promoting new icebreakers, 
the MKH also collaborated with its Swedish sister organisation, the shipyards, and classifi-
cation societies to renew insurance classes for ships operating on the Baltic.105 The existing 
ice-class requirements had been revised in 1960s, but they still rested upon assumption 
on ice-mechanics from the 1930s. The requirements were based on outdated assumptions 
in metallurgy and ship strength theory. Especially the ice strengthening required for the 
highest IA Super-class was thought to make a ship too heavy and too expensive, while 
not significantly increasing its ability to navigate through ice. Only a couple of such ships 
were ordered because of the excess costs of building.106 The new Finnish–Swedish ice-
class requirements, implemented in 1971, were reformulated based on latest research, They 
increased the requirements for hull strength and engine power required in the lower classes, 
but loosened requirements for the highest IA Super class. The ships in the two highest ice-
classes were freed from icebreaking assistance fees and those in the highest class received 
a reduction from general navigation fees. This became a remarkable economic incentive 
to shipping companies to upgrade their fleets. The share of ice-strengthened vessels in the 
Finnish merchant marine started to grow steadily and provided companies a strong footing 
on domestic transport markets.107 Consequently, both the costs of ice-damages and the 
critical attitude of ship owners towards winter navigation on the Gulf of Bothnia began to 
decrease.
That all major Finnish ports are now kept open throughout the winter every year did 
not happen without political conflicts and compromises. Winter navigation has also been 
strongly shaped by technological developments that opened new cost-efficient possibil-
ities for the export industries, which in turn called for increased reliability in shipping. 
The technological and economic facts used to justify new icebreaker procurements always 
Figure 5. the Finnish five Mark coin, depicting the icebreaker ‘tarmo’, became the highest denomination 
coin in 1971. the designer wanted to explicitly break the romantic notion of Finland as a country of nature 
and farmers. source: talvio, Suomen rahat, 101–3. the picture presents the 1979 renewed version with the 
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were intertwined with ideology. Integral to the icebreaker question was the idea of Finland 
as a Western, modern and interconnected country. Icebreakers were not mere tools in 
developing this idea but also dramatic symbols of its success (Figure 5). In 1978 MKH 
decided to celebrate Finnish winter navigation. To justify the festivities and to ensure pub-
lic interest, MKH declared the day the privately owned passenger steamer ‘Expressen’ had 
resumed operation in 15 December 1877 as the birthday of Finnish winter navigation. The 
landmark was celebrated with jubilees, commemorative stamps, and a book from doctor 
Jorma Pohjanpalo.108 For Ramsay in 1949, the history of Finnish winter navigation revealed 
an inconsistent effort to take sea ice as a critical national problem. Now in 1978, less than 
30 years later, that history was presented as long and glorious.109
Conclusion
During the century 1878–1978, Finland created a winter navigation system that effectively 
broke the power of winter over everyday life. At the same time, the country transformed 
from a non-independent, backward region on the edge of Europe into a sovereign, modern 
European country. In this article, we have argued that the development of the extensive 
winter seafaring system cannot be explained without understanding the intentionally inter-
woven aspirations for a modern, nation state and the winter navigation system.
Initially between 1878 and 1917, growing foreign trade and increasing demand for secu-
rity of supplies throughout the year framed the Finnish seasonal isolation from continental 
Europe as a national reverse salient. Technological development abroad transformed winter 
sea ice from a natural fact into a technologically solvable challenge. During this first stage, the 
system builders were Finnish nationalistic-minded fennomans, technocratic industrialists 
and engineers who managed to muster limited available intellectual and material resources 
for a complex national project before the nation was a nation state. Finnish icebreaking 
was not a direct result from ice as a defining condition in Finnish life. A combination of 
political, economic, and cultural factors made strengthening connections with the West – 
instead of Russia – essential to national decision-making in the Grand Duchy 1878–1917.
The idea of Finland as a modern country was a relevant component in the winter naviga-
tion discussions throughout the period. The historical actors shared a willingness to develop 
Finland and have it considered a modern industrial country. Consequently, they chose to 
use icebreakers as a suitable and practical means to manifest this desire. Icebreakers fit well 
with the national romantic idea of the Finnish people heroically mastering over harsh nature 
and completed the picture of Finland drawn by artists. Even the first icebreakers were able 
to do something no other Finnish ship could: they were able to fight against geographical 
conditions. Such tangible tools enabled a technological version of nation-building.
During the second period 1918–1947, economic nationalism shaped the transition of 
Finland from a Russian province to an independent country, affecting legislation, the role of 
state-owned companies and patriotic management.110 As Niklas Jensen-Eriksen has pointed 
out, economic nationalism did not lead to protectionism in Finland, but instead supported 
the building of a relatively open and increasingly export-oriented industry.111 In a small 
country with restricted home market demand, increasing exports was the primary way to 
expand industrial production. Export industry brought work, capital and technology to 
the rural backcountry. Thus, industry was not just about economy. The technocratic elite 
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why the big, expensive public investments in icebreaking were considered justified despite 
the small size of the public sector.
During the inter-war period, icebreakers became accepted as a visible example of 
Finnishness at home functioning as a material tool to strengthen social ties within a frac-
tured nation. Towards the end of the period, a coherent national story of Finnish winter 
navigation started to take form. The narrative translated the original history of technology 
transfer and transnational cooperation into a national heroic story and linked technologi-
cal decision-making with a preferred history. This nationalistic perspective on technology 
was focused on successful applications of foreign technology and their role in enhancing 
national welfare, not on technological self-sufficiency. Icebreakers were ‘Finnish’ through 
their operation in Finland and for Finland, not because they would be built in or developed 
by Finland.112 The necessity of Finnish winter navigation did not bring about a Finnish 
icebreaker construction industry. Nationally important vessels were bought from more 
advanced shipbuilders abroad during early decades of winter navigation.
The third phase of the development 1948–1978 turned the focus from ensuring uninter-
rupted shipping to ensuring uninterrupted shipping in all major Finnish ports. Though ice-
breakers were already accepted as a fundamental component of the national infrastructure, 
the number, function, and reach of the icebreaker fleet was a subject of a fierce debate. The 
numerous reports and studies aiming to provide a ‘rational’ solution to the winter naviga-
tion question were often conflicting in their recommendations. Purely technological and 
economic arguments are not enough to explain the final conclusions: A modern country 
should ensure ongoing shipping from both southern and northern Finland, and to afford 
‘the insurance for reliability’ in shipping in the form of extra icebreaking capacity. Two 
individuals, President Kekkonen and director Jääsalo, were especially important during 
this stage. The question of opening northern ports was undoubtedly a political tool for 
both of them. Kekkonen advanced his stated regional policy in the North, while Jääsalo 
strengthened MKH within the Finnish public infrastructure sphere. Importantly they were 
able to raise enough parliamentary support for new icebreaker acquisitions through the 
widely accepted idea of a modern and westward facing Finland and elimination of seasonal 
variation as its reverse salient.
In the Finnish case, the meaning of technological modernity seems to have followed a 
particular trajectory: from appropriation of technology through transfer and use during 
the first period before independence, to technology application and utilisation during the 
inter-war period of the second period, and finally to independent development in the post-
war years. Icebreakers were engaged in building a certain form of an imagined Finnish 
community but their role varied in meaning and significance from the late nineteenth to 
late twentieth centuries. In our story, three aspects of the Finnish national idea became 
highlighted: Finland as a Western country, Finland as a modern society and Finland as an 
integrated nation. That the Finnish national idea is today understood as industrial rather 
than agrarian, Western rather than Eastern, and modern in a European sense was a con-
tested process.
Nationalistic rhetoric aimed to give meaning to the past, the future and the present 
through storytelling that gave the nation form in time and space. Icebreakers became one 
such story in Finland. While they did not drive the national history of Finland, the ideal 
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give form to ideas of the nation. The aforementioned actors presented the Janus face of 
nationalism as a simultaneous view to the past and the future, inwards and outwards.
While the issue of Finnish winter navigation is small in terms of resources and geograph-
ical impact in comparison to commonly perceived projects of national prestige, it manifests 
a clear case of technological nationalism. Finnish engineers and politicians recognised an 
issue, sought an answer and developed solutions that were not as relevant to other techno-
logically more advanced countries. This process connected Finland to and differentiated 
it from other modern industrial countries. The notion of Finland as the nation of winter 
seafarers and icebreakers lives on to this day. We suggest that this icebreaker mythology 
persists because it aligns neatly with Finland’s dominant notion of its distinctive place in 
the world.
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Committee on the Reliability of Winter Navigation]. Grand Duchy of Finland Senate Committee 
1896:1. Helsingfors: Edlundska bokhandeln, 1896.
Haapala, Pertti. “The Fate of the Welfare State.” Historiallinen aikakauskirja, no. 2 (1998): 142–149.
Haapavaara, Heikki. Martin Saarikangas: Iso-Masa, laivanrakentaja [Martin Saarikangas: the 
Shipbuilder]. Helsinki: Gummerus, 2002.
Hecht, Gabrielle. “Planning a Technological Nation: Systems Thinking and the Politics of National 
Identity in Post-War France.” In Systems, Experts and Computers: The Systems Approach in 
Management and Engineering, World War II and After, edited by Agatha C. Hughes, and Thomas 
Parke Hughes, 133–160. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
Hecht, Gabrielle. The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 2009.
Hecht, Gabrielle, and Michael Thad Allen. “Introduction: Authority, Political Machines, and 
Technology’s History.” In Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and 
Agatha Chipley Hughes, edited by Michael Thad Allen, and Gabrielle Hecht, 1–23. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Heikkinen, Sakari. Paperia maailmalle: Suomen paperitehtaitten yhdistys – Finnpap 1918–1996 [Paper 
to the World: Finnish Paper Manufacturers Association Finnpap 1918–1996]. Helsinki: Otava, 
2000.
Heikkinen, Sakari, and Seppo Tiihonen. Valtiovarainministeriön historia. 2, Kriisinselvittäjä: 1917-
1966 [History of the Finnish Ministry of Finance, Part 2]. Helsinki: Edita, 2009.
Hjerppe, Riitta. Finland’s Trade and Policy in the 20th Century. Helsinki: Valtiovarainministeriö, 1993.
Holmström, John. “Banbrytaren inom vintersjöfarten: om Jakob Robert (Ivanovitj) Runeberg.” 
[Forerunner in Winter Navigation: On Jakob Robert Runeberg.] In Finlandssvenska tekniker: Det 
fjärde bandet. Vol. 4, 8–24. Helsingfors: Tekniska föreningen i Finland, 2003.
Holmström, John. “K. Albin Johansson: den kontroversiella och egenmäktiga isbrytar- och 
varvskonsulten.” [K. Albin Johansson: The Controversial and Obstinate Icebreaker and Dock 
Consultant.] In Finlandssvenska tekniker. Det sjätte bandet, Framtidsbyggare [Finnish-Swedish 
Engineers: The Sixth Volume, Future Builders], edited by Johan Stén. Helsingfors: Tekniska 
föreningen i Finland, 2007.
Hughes, Thomas. American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870–1970. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
Hughes, Thomas. “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems.” In The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, edited by Wiebe 
E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, 51–82. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.
Hughes, Thomas. Rescuing Prometheus: Four Monumental Projects that Changed the Modern World. 
New York: Pantheon, 1998.
Hughes, Thomas. “The Seamless Web: Technology, Science, Etcetera, Etcetera.” Social Studies of Science 
16, no. 2 (1986): 281–292.
Häkkinen, Antti. 1860-luvun suuret nälkävuodet: tutkimus eri väestöryhmien mielialoista ja 
toimintamalleista [The Great Famine of 1860s: Research into Modes of Action in Various Population 
Groups]. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 1989.
Jäänmurtaja Tarmo: Kantasatama, Kotka [Icebreaker Tarmo: Inner Harbour, Kotka]. Kotka: 
Kymenlaakson museo, 1993.
Jääsalo, Helge. Pohjoiset satamat auki [Northern Ports Opened]. Oulu: Pohjoinen, 1980.
Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas. “Business, Economic Nationalism and Finnish Foreign Trade during the 19th 
and 20th Centuries.” The French Economic History Review, no.3 (2015): 40–57.
Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas. Metsäteollisuuden maa: 4, läpimurto: metsäteollisuus kasvun, integraation 
ja kylmän sodan Euroopassa 1950-1973 [The Land of Forestry Vol. 4: Breakthrough 1950–1973]. 
Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2007.
Johnman, Lewis, and Hugh Murphy. British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918: A Political Economy 


































HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY  247
Josephson, Paul. The Conquest of the Russian Arctic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
Jussila, Osmo, David Arter, Eva-Kaisa Arter, Seppo Hentilä, and Jukka Nevakivi. From Grand Duchy 
to Modern State: A Political History of Finland since 1809. London: Hurst, 1999.
Karttunen, Ilkka, Matti Pietikäinen, and Marja-Liisa Suopanki. Uljaksen vanavedessä: John Nurmisen 
kauppahuoneen ja varustamon historiaa 1886–1967: miehiä, laivoja, elämää JN-lipun alla [In 
the Van of Uljas: History of John Nurminen Trade House and Shipping Company 1886–1967]. 
Helsinki: John Nurmisen Säätiö, 2006.
Kaukiainen, Yrjö. Ulos maailmaan! Suomalaisen merenkulun historia [Out to the World!: History of 
Finnish Seafaring]. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2008.
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, and Pirkko Leino-Kaukiainen. Navigare necesse: Merenkulkulaitos 1917–1992 
[History of the Finnish Board of Navigation 1917–1992]. Helsinki: Merenkulkulaitos, 1992.
Kekkonen, Urho. Onko maallamme malttia vaurastua? [Does Our Country Have the Patience to 
Grow Rich?] Helsingissä: Otava, 1952.
Klinge, Matti. The Finnish Tradition: Essays on Structures and Identities in the North of Europe. Helsinki: 
Suomen historiallinen seura, 1993.
Kuisma, Markku. Metsäteollisuuden maa: 1, Metsäteollisuuden maa: Suomi, metsät ja kansainvälinen 
järjestelmä 1620-1920 [The Land of Forestry Vol. 1: Beginnings 1620–1920]. 2nd ed. Helsinki: 
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2006.
Kuisma, Markku. “Valta ja vaikutukset: yrityshistorian uusia mahdollisuuksia.” [Power and Effects: New 
Possibilities in Business History.] In Historia nyt: näkemyksiä suomalaisesta historiantutkimuksesta, 
edited by Pekka Ahtiainen, et al. Historiallisen yhdistyksen julkaisuja, no. 5, 1990.
Kukkonen, Pertti, and Esko Tikkanen. Jäänmurtajat Ja Talviliikenne. Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 1970.
Laati, Iisakki. Suomen luotsi- ja majakkalaitoksen historia 1808–1946. Helsinki: Merenkulkuhallitus, 
1946.
Landtman, Christian. Minnen från mina år vid Wärtsilä [Memories from My Time with Wärtsilä]. 
Helsinki: Self-published, 2011.
Laurell, Seppo. Höyrymurtajien aika: historiikki höyrykäyttöisten valtionjäänmurtajien aikakaudesta 
[The Era of Steam Icebreakers: History of Steam Driven State Icebreaker Period]. Helsinki: 
Merenkulkuhallitus, 1992.
Laurell, Seppo, Erkki Riimala, and Elwa Sandbacka. Through Ice and Snow: The Story of Finnish Winter 
Navigation. Helsinki: Ship Historical Society of Finland, 1985.
Matala, Saara. “Läpi kylmän sodan ja jään: suomalaisesta jäänmurrosta kansainväliseksi teollisuudeksi 
1950–1989.” Tekniikan Waiheita [Finnish Quarterly for the History of Technology] 33, no. 2 (2015): 
5–25.
Michelsen, Karl-Erik. Valtio, teknologia, tutkimus: VTT ja kansallisen tutkimusjärjestelmän kehitys 
[The State, Technology, Research: Development of the Finnish National Research System]. Espoo: 
Valtion teknillinen tutkimuskeskus, 1993.
Michelsen, Karl-Erik. Viides sääty: insinöörit suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa [The Fifth Estate: Engineers 
in the Finnish Society]. Helsinki: Tekniikan akateemisten liitto, 1999.
Michelsen, Karl-Erik, and Markku Kuisma. “Nationalism and Industrial Development in Finland.” 
Business and Economic History 21 (1992): 343–353.
Myllyntaus, Timo. Electrifying Finland: The Transfer of a New Technology into a Late Industrialising 
Economy. London: Macmillan, 1991.
Myllyntaus, Timo. “The Finnish Model of Technology Transfer.” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 38, no. 3 (1990): 625–643.
Mäntylä, Matti. Pohjois-Suomea kehittämässä: periferia Urho Kekkosen politiikan kohteena ja 
vallankäytön välineenä vuosina 1950–1981 [Developing Northern Finland: Periphery in Urho 
Kekkonen’s Politics and Policy 1950–1981]. Rovaniemi: Pohjois-Suomen Historiallinen Yhdistys, 
2016.
Niku, Risto. Kahdeksan tuomittua miestä: sotasyyllisten vankilavuodet [Eight Convicted Men: War 
Criminals’ Time in Prison]. Helsinki: Edita, 2005.
Ojala, Jari, and Yrjö Kaukiainen. “Finnish Shipping – A Nordic Exception?”. In Global Shipping in 
Small Nations: Nordic Experiences after 1960, edited by Stig Tenold and Martin Jes Iversen, 129–155. 


































248   S. MATALA AND A. SAHARI
Ostersehlte, Christian von. “Die Geschichte des Eisbrecherwesens im Überlick: von den Anfängden 
und der Entwicklung des ersten Ausgereiften Eisbrechers in Hamburg bis zur Gegenwart.” [The 
History of Icebreaking: From the Beginning and the Development of the First Mature Icebreaker 
in Hamburg to the Present.] Deutsches schiffahrtsarchiv 9, no. 6 (1983): 109–116.
Paavonen, Tapani. “Special Arrangements for the Soviet Trade in Finland’s Integration Solution – A 
Consequence of Finland’s International Position or Pursuit of Profit?” In East-West Trade and the 
Cold War, edited by Eloranta, Jari and Jari Ojala, 153–168, University of Jyväskylä, 2005.
Palmén, K. E. Om isbrytareångfartyg och vintersjöfart [On Icebreakers and Winter Navigation]. 
Helsingfors: Tekniska föreningen, 1894.
Pihkala, Erkki. Suomen ulkomaankauppa 1860–1917 [Finnish Foreign Trade 1860–1917]. Helsinki: 
Suomen Pankki, 1969.
Pohjanpalo, Jorma. 100 Vuotta Suomen Talvimerenkulkua [100 Years of Finnish Winter Navigation]. 
Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus, 1978.
Pulkkinen, Tuija. “One Language, One Mind: The Nationalist Tradition in Finnish Political Culture.” 
In Europe’s Northern Frontier: Perspectives on Finland’s Western Identity, edited by Philip Landon, 
and Tuomas M. S. Lehtonen, 118–137. Jyväskylä: PS-kustannus 1999.
Ramsay, Henrik. Jääsaarron murtajat: Suomen talvimerenkulun historiaa [Breakers of Ice Embargo: 
History of Finnish Winter Navigation]. Translated by Jukka Rangell. Porvoo: WSOY, 1949.
Russell, Mark A. “Steamship Nationalism: Transatlantic Passenger Liners as Symbols of the German 
Empire.” International Journal of Maritime History 28, no. 2 (2016): 313–334. doi:10.1177%
2F0843871416637587.
Satamakomitean mietintö. (Port Committee chaired by Svante Sundman: Report). Komiteamietinnöt 
8. Helsinki: Valtioneuvosto, 1958.
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